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Recent Developments 
State v. Lee: 
Application of the Inevitable Discovery Exclusion Exception Cannot Make 
Evidence Obtained Through an Improperly Executed Narcotics Search 
Warrant Admissible 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a case of 
first impression, held application of 
the inevitable discovery exclusion 
exception cannot make evidence 
obtained through an improperly 
executed narcotics search warrant 
admissible. State v. Lee, 374 Md. 
275, 821 A.2d 922 (2003). The 
court held failure of police to knock 
and announce their presence while 
executing a search warrant that did 
not contain a no-knock clause 
violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Id The court further stated, to admit 
evidence obtained in such an illegally 
executed search negates Fourth 
Amendment knock and announce 
protections and allows officers to 
use forcible entry under any valid 
search warrant. Id. 
In September 1998, a Harford 
County district court judge issued a 
warrant for police to search the 
home of Kai Ruchell Lee ("Lee") 
on suspected narcotics charges. 
The warrant did not contain a no-
knock clause permitting surprise 
entry. In executing the warrant, law 
enforcement officials entered Lee's 
home without knocking or an-
nouncing their presence, searched, 
and then seized, inter alia, over 
twenty-six grams of cocaine. 
Subsequently, Lee was charged with 
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possession with intent to distribute 
a controlled, dangerous substance. 
Prior to trial, Lee filed a Motion 
to Suppress the cocaine, contending 
the no-knock search was invalid 
because it violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights. The Circuit 
Court for Harford County denied 
his motion holding the easy de-
structibility of evidence was an 
exigent circumstance justifying the 
officers' surprise tactics. Lee 
appealed to the court of special 
appeals, which reversed and stated 
no exigent circumstances existed 
and the failure of police to knock 
and announce rendered the search 
unreasonable. The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland granted certiorari 
to determine if evidence obtained 
pursuant to a valid warrant under 
which police failed to knock and 
announce prior to entry was 
admissible under the inevitable 
discovery exception to the exclu-
sionary rule. 
The court first discussed the 
knock and announce rule. Id at 
282-91, 821 A.2d at 926-31. Then 
the court reviewed the inevitable 
discovery exception to the ex-
clusionary rule, including a dis-
cussion of its companion argument, 
the independent source doctrine. 
Id. at 291-316,821 A.2d at 931-
45. 
The court in Henson v. State 
established Maryland's require-
ment that an officer "give proper 
notice of his purpose and authority 
and be denied admittance before 
using force to break and enter." Id. 
at 282, 821 A.2d at 926 (Henson, 
236 Md. 518,521-22,204 A.2d 
516,518-19 (1964». Some 
courts have carved out exceptions 
to this general rule in cases where 
it was evident that the officer's 
purpose was known, or where 
announcement would frustrate 
arrest, increase peril to the 
arresting officer, or permit des-
truction of evidence. Id. at 285, 
821 A.2d at 927. The Henson 
court expressly stated narcotics 
searches require an element of 
surprise entry because, with 
opportunity, evidence may be easily 
destroyed. Id. The court empha-
sized that Henson's blanket 
exception to the knock and 
announce requirement was contrary 
to subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions and was no longer good 
law. Id at 316,821 A.2d at 930. 
The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of surprise entry 
in narcotics cases and a per se rule 
allowing surprise entry in Richards 
v. Wisconsin, and concluded 
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police entry requires an element of 
reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment, leaving it to lower 
courts to determine reasonableness 
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 
286-87, 821 A.2d at 929 (citing 
Richards, 520 U.S. 385 (1995)). 
The court of appeals reviewed this 
reasonableness standard as applied 
by other jurisdictions, noting the 
Supreme Court had overturned a 
blanket exception to the knock and 
announce requirement in narcotics 
cases. Id. at 286-87,821 A.2d at 
928-29. 
The court went on to address 
the State's contention that the 
search warrant was an independent 
source for the seizure, separate from 
the entry, and the cocaine would 
have inevitably been discovered 
through execution of the valid 
search warrant. Id. at 291, 821 
A.2d at 931. The court noted one 
purpose of the general rule, 
preventing admission of evidence 
obtained through the improper 
execution of a valid search warrant, 
is to reduce police misconduct. Id. 
at 297, 821 A.2d at 935. 
Conversely, a purpose of the 
inevitable discovery exclusionary 
rule admitting illegally obtained 
evidence is to prevent the prose-
cution from being placed in a worse 
position than it would have occupied 
had the search warrant been 
properly executed, while precluding 
the prosecution from profiting from 
improper activity. Id. at 297, 821 
A.2d at 933-35. For evidence to 
be admissible despite a knock and 
announce violation, the prosecution 
must show it possesses a source, 
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both independent and free of 
constitutional violation, which would 
have inevitably led to the discovery 
of the evidence. Id. 
The court cited Maryland 
cases that reviewed the inevitable 
discovery and independent source 
exclusion exceptions, noting admis-
sion of evidence discoverable by 
means independent of the violation. 
Id. at 305, 821 A.2d at 939. The 
court then reviewed other juris-
dictions' decisions and agreed when 
"execution ofthe warrant is illegal, 
the State cannot invoke that very 
warrant as an independent source 
of the illegal entry." Id at313, 821 
A.2d at 944. The court agreed with 
the reasoning in United States v. 
Marts, that with the application of 
the independent source exception in 
cases of failure to knock and 
announce "an officer could obviate 
illegal entry in every instance simply 
by looking to the information used 
to obtain the warrant [and] in 
executing a valid search warrant, 
could break in doors of private 
homes without sanction." Id at 304, 
821 A.2dat 939 (citing Marts, 986 
F.2d 1216 (8th Cir. 1993)). 
Contrary to the court's com-
ment in Henson, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland noted a 
blanket exception to the knock and 
announce requirement in narcotics 
cases directly opposes the Supreme 
Court rejection of a per se rule and 
its requirement for a case-by-case 
analysis. Id. at 308-09,821 A.2d 
at 941. The court of appeals stated 
that applying inevitable discovery 
and independent source exceptions 
removed the knock and announce 
requirement from Fourth Amend-
ment protection, permitting unan-
nounced entry under any valid 
search warrant. Id. at 316, 821 
A.2d at 945. Therefore, evidence 
obtained in the search should have 
been suppressed. Id. 
Prior to this decision, Maryland 
was among a minority of states, as 
illustrated by the Henson decision. 
Henson supported a per se rule in 
narcotics cases, which suggested 
the mere acquirement of a search 
warrant justified any means neces-
sary for entry. Under Henson, 
society's protection from criminal 
activity was paramount to a private 
individual's rights. There is a 
balance weighed by some states in 
favor of government privileges, but 
the court of appeals stressed that in 
Maryland, rights of the individual are 
not secondary. This decision may 
affect not only the manner in which 
police officers execute search 
warrants, but it may also impact 
other methods of evidence 
acquisition. Some long-standing 
accepted methods of investigation, 
such as witness or suspect inter-
rogation, may be viewed more 
critically in light of this decision, 
where the end result does not justify 
the means. 
